








capacity	 of	 MNCs	 to	 construct	 organizational	 circuits	 that	 enable	 taxes	 to	 be	






that	 arise	 from	 this,	 and	 the	benefits	 of	 unitary	 taxation	 as	 an	 alternative,	 and	
places	this	in	the	context	of	current	policy	trends.	The	purpose	of	the	paper	is	to	





The	 European	 Commission	 estimates	 tax	 avoidance	 and	 evasion	 within	 the	
European	Union	 to	be	around	€1	 trillion	per	annum	(EC,	2012,	p.	2).	The	UK’s	
budget	deficit	 for	the	financial	year	2013‐2014	was	approximately	£108	billion	
and	public	 sector	net	debt	was	£1.4	 trillion.	 It	 is	within	 this	 context	of	 chronic	
public	debt	(see	Thompson,	2013;	Hay,	2013)	that	corporations	are	able	to	pay	
effective	 tax	 rates	 that	 are	 many	 times	 smaller	 than	 the	 headline	 rate	 of	
corporation	 tax.	 Any	 business	 able	 to	 locate	 separate	 entities	 in	 different	 tax	
jurisdictions	is	able	to	legally	limit	the	tax	that	it	pays	in	ways	that	are	not	open	to	
other	 firms	 or	 the	 ordinary	 citizen.	 This	 legal	 minimisation	 is	 tax	 avoidance	
(evasion	is	categorised	as	illegal	tax	behaviour,	the	difference	is	elaborated	later).	
As	 any	 reader	 of	 the	media	will	 know,	 tax	 avoidance	 has	 become	 a	 particular	
problem	 focused	 on	 multinational	 corporations	 (MNCs).	 The	 following	 paper	
explores,	with	a	focus	on	MNCs,	how	tax	minimisation	is	achieved.	This	is	based	









to	 discussion	 among	 only	 the	 legally	 trained	 and	 technically	 proficient.	 The	
purpose	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 improve	 awareness	 amongst	 a	 politically	 literate	







and	 embedded	 interests.	 In	 a	 democracy	 and	within	 international	 society,	 the	
former	augments	the	latter.		


















of	 taxation	 associated	with	MNCs	 have	 a	 root	 cause	 in	 a	 ‘deep	 structural	 flaw’	
(Picciotto,	 2014,	 2012;	 CRC,	 2014).	 The	 fundamentals	 of	 the	 rules	 governing	
taxation	for	MNCs	date	back	to	the	1920s.	The	rules	are	ad	hoc,	based	on	many	














and	 complex	 systems	 of	 importation	 for	 final	 assembly.	 Changes	 create	 great	
scope	for	differentiations	along	chains	of	activity	and	this	has	normalised	(in	the	
sense	 they	 are	 common	 and	 thus	 expected)	 the	 existence	 of	 complex	
interconnections	 of	 entities	 (Clausing,	 2006).	 Concomitantly,	 there	 has	 been	 a	
qualitative	 shift	 in	 regard	 of	 the	 goods	 and	 services	 produced	 –	 tied	 more	 to	
branding,	intellectual	property	rights	and	patents	‐	and	how	they	are	sold	(via	the	
Web).	There	can	be	many	types	of	separation	and	this	can	conceal	 (within	and	





capacity	 to	do	 so,	 and	 in	many	places	has	 actively	 encouraged	 the	practice.	As	
Palan	 (2002)	 sets	 out,	 many	 states	 have	 “commercialised”	 their	 sovereignty	
within	a	global	political	economy.			
A	 further	 aspect	 of	 tax	 agreements	 arises	 because	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 links	
between	 entities.	 An	 MNC	 is	 a	 recognizable	 organization.	 The	 term	 is	 not	







particular	 places.	 This	 has	 tax	 consequences.	 The	 majority	 of	 income	 may	 be	
reported	in	one	tax	jurisdiction	to	the	detriment	of	another,	for	example,	country	





A	 means	 was	 then	 required	 to	 assess	 how	 values	 for	 transactions	 are	









reflect	 distanced	 market	 relations,	 then	 the	 very	 form	 of	 the	 principle	 is	
incoherent	from	the	point	of	view	of	theory	of	the	firm.iii		
Thereafter,	 the	arm’s	 length	principle	has	proved	both	conceptually	and	
practically	 problematic.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 arm’s	 length	 principle	 is	 to	 assess	
transactions	in	comparison	to	the	value	that	would	be	created	by	a	market	price.	




transactions	 occur	 between	 oligopolistic	 MNCs,	 and/or	 involve	 the	
apportionment	of	uniquely	defined	values	based	on	 royalties	 for	 licensed	uses.	
Unique	 values	 in	 general	 create	 the	 problem	 of	 what	 is	 a	 value	 and	 how	 it	 is	
derived	–	particular	problems	for	intellectual	property,	intangible	assets	and	the	
digital	economy.	So,	not	only	is	it	typically	difficult	to	apply	a	practical	test	of	what	
a	 competitive	market	 price	would	 have	 been	 in	 a	 given	 case,	 the	 very	 form	of	
modern	economies	seem	to	be	developing	in	ways	that	exceed	the	capacity	of	the	
arm’s	length	principle	to	be	applied	effectively	(UK	HMRC,	2015a).	There	is	then	
















problem	 is	 that	 MNCs	 are	 capable	 of	 particular	 forms	 of	 coordination,	 and	
separate	entity	status	creates	incentives	for	coordination	to	become	focused	on	
tax.	MNCs	are	provided	with	incentives	to	develop	strategies	that	seek	to	minimise	
taxation	 through	 shifting	where	 sales,	 revenues	 and	 profits	 are	 reported.	 New	
entities	 are	 created	 in	particular	 localities	 and	 functions	 are	hived	off	 to	 those	
entities	 to	create	organizational	 circuits.	Organizational	circuit	 is	 intended	as	a	
convenient	descriptive	term	for	 the	connectivity	of	otherwise	separate	entities.	





post‐Fordist	 period	 has	 involved	 the	 development	 of	 a	 variegated,	 unevenly	
developing	 neoliberalism	 (e.g.	 Peck,	 2013).	 Within	 this	 development	 one	 key	
feature	to	emerge	has	been	a	disaggregation	of	firm	activity,	spreading	out	across	
territories	 and	 involving	 different	 types	 of	 ownership	 and	 control,	 creating	 a	
global	value	chain	(Gereffi,	et	al,	2005).	Much	of	the	focus	of	work	on	global	value	




“[T]he	 linked	 forms	 of	 capital	 seeking	 to	 avoid	 accountability	 during	
processes	of	pecuniary	wealth	creation.	By	accountability	we	mean	fiscal	
claims,	 legal	 obligations,	 or	 regulatory	 oversight…	 wealth	 chains	 are	
articulated	not	only	 through	cartographic	and	sovereign	spaces	but	also	
within	 financial	 products…	 Wealth	 chains	 hide,	 obscure	 and	 relocate	












network)	 location.	 This	 entity	 will	 be	 the	 one	 to	 which	 the	majority	 of	
income,	revenue,	and	profits	are	ultimately	channelled	for	reporting.	A	key	
characteristic	of	this	location	is	that	it	applies	little	or	no	corporation	tax.	











This	 advantage	 may	 be	 either	 a	 lower	 level	 of	 corporation	 tax	 or	 an	
amenable	government	willing	to	negotiate	a	specific	tax	arrangement	with	
the	MNC.iv	Crucially	(in	this	initial	generic	example),	this	locality	must	also	
allow	 reporting	 in	 the	 location	where	 (A)	has	been	 created,	providing	a	
channel	to	(A).			





















each	 contracts	 to	 (B)	 under	 a	 licence	 to	 operate	 or	 pays	 some	
significant	proportion	of	 the	value	of	 transactions	as	a	 fee	 to	 (B),	
which	licences	the	use	of	the	name	and	any	related	paraphernalia.	
This	is	essentially	a	form	of	transfer	pricing.	The	fee	can	be	adjusted	
such	 that	 (C)	 (D)	 (E)	 report	 any	 given	 revenue	 for	 tax	 purposes,	
ranging	 from	a	 small	 profit	 to	 breaking‐even	or	 a	 reported	 loss.v	
Variations	of	this	strategy	can	be	used	by	many	different	kinds	of	





4. Entity	(B)	 then	channels	some	significant	proportion	of	 its	concentrated	
income	to	entity	(A)	where	little	or	no	corporation	tax	is	paid	on	any	profit	
reported	 there.	 The	 tax	 authority	 of	 the	 locality	 of	 entity	 (B)	 may	 be	
satisfied	based	on	its	small	proportion	of	the	concentrated	revenue.	It	may	



















The	 technical	 term	 for	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 exploiting	 organizational	
circuits	 to	 reduce	 real	 taxation	 is	base	erosion	and	profit	 shifting	 (BEPS).	Base	
erosion	refers	to	the	reduction	in	the	total	revenues	that	ought	otherwise	to	be	




Over	 time,	 the	 current	 rules	 have	 also	 revealed	weaknesses	 that	 create	
opportunities	 for	 BEPS.	 BEPS	 relates	 chiefly	 to	 instances	 where	 the	
interaction	of	different	tax	rules	leads	to	double	non‐taxation	or	less	than	
single	 taxation.	 It	 also	 relates	 to	 arrangements	 that	 achieve	 no	 or	 low	
taxation	by	shifting	profits	away	from	the	jurisdictions	where	the	activities	
creating	those	profits	take	place.	No	or	low	taxation	is	not	per	se	a	cause	of	
concern,	 but	 it	 becomes	 so	 when	 it	 is	 associated	 with	 practices	 that	
artificially	segregate	taxable	income	from	the	activities	that	generate	it.	In	
other	words,	what	creates	tax	policy	concerns	 is	that,	due	to	gaps	in	the	
interaction	 of	 different	 tax	 systems,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 because	 of	 the	


























to	 some	 other	 (see	 Picciotto,	 1992).	 Moreover,	 use	 of	 the	 term	 can	 give	 the	
impression	 that	 it	 is	 only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 localities	 that	 are	 problematic.	
However,	highly	visible	sites	such	as	the	Cayman	Islands	are	merely	destinations	


























specialisation,	 becoming	 destinations	 commonly	 recognized	 as	 tax	 havens,	 but	
	 8
within	 a	 broader	 process	 of	 commercialization	 of	 sovereignty	 (Palan,	 2002),	





For	 example,	 the	 OECD	 is	 the	 major	 source	 of	 expertise,	 regulatory	
proposals	 and	 mechanisms	 for	 international	 tax	 law.	 International	 tax	 law	 is	
highly	specialised	and	so	the	OECD	tends	to	draw	its	personnel	from	a	limited	pool,	
essentially	 dominated	 by	 the	 major	 accountancy	 and	 consultancy	MNCs.	 Most	







One	 can	 of	 course	 overstate	 the	 point	 here	 (see	 Eccleston	 et	 al	 2015;	
Woodward,	2004).	Competitive	complexity	does	not	simply	result	in	a	system	that	










the	 controversial	 aspects	 of	 activity	 in	 Ireland	 has	 been	 the	 negotiation	 of	










competition	 commissioner).	 Institutions	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 any	 constructive	
countertendency	 that	 addresses	 tax	 avoidance.	 The	 OECD	 approach	 to	 BEPS	
identifies	the	issue	as	one	of	disjunctions	in	tax	treaties	and	systems.	The	focus	on	








that	 we	 think	 are	 deeply	 problematic”,	 (Waterfield,	 2015).	 A	 case‐by‐case	


















and	 any	 firm	 that	 chooses	 to	 be	 more	 responsible	 are	 put	 at	 a	 competitive	
disadvantage,	and	so	the	very	system	militates	against	any	single	national	firm	or	





whilst	 the	 general	 problem	 persists.	 Second,	 revenue	 losses	 undermine	 the	
capacity	of	the	state	to	fund	public	services,	and	address	problems	of	the	business	
cycle	 through	 fiscal	 policy	 without	 creating	 further	 debt.	 This	 has	 been	
particularly	 noticeable	 during	 the	 Great	 Recession	 that	 followed	 the	 Global	
Financial	Crisis.ix														
	 As	noted	 in	 the	 introduction,	 there	 are	many	eye‐catching	 statistics	one	
might	 call	 attention	 to	 here.x	 Furthermore,	 many	 prominent	 cases	 have	 been	
reported	 in	 recent	 years.	 In	 2012	 the	 UK	House	 of	 Commons	 Public	 Accounts	
Committee	 called	 Google,	 Amazon	 and	 Starbucks	 as	 witnesses	 in	 a	 broader	
investigation	into	corporate	taxation	(HCCCPA,	2012).	A	follow	up	report	focusing	
particularly	 on	 Google	 highlighted	 that	 between	 2006	 and	 2011	 the	 firm	
generated	revenue	from	the	UK	of	US$18	billion	whilst	paying	the	equivalent	of	
US$16	million	 in	 corporation	 tax	over	 the	 same	period	 (HCCCPA,	2013:	p.	15).	













financial	 year	 2012‐13,	 and	 put	 the	 tax	 gap	 at	 £34	 billion	 (Aldrick,	 2014a).	



















binding	 international	 tax	 law	 that	 is	 not	 based	 on	 separate	 entity	 status.	 This	
means	 treating	 the	 entire	MNC	 as	 a	 single	 entity	 for	 tax	 purposes.	 That	 entity	
produces	one	 set	 of	master	 accounts,	 and	 thus	one	ultimate	 income	and	profit	
statement.	The	accounts	are	reported	to	a	designated	tax	authority.	A	proportion	
of	the	profit	is	then	allocated	to	individual	states	based	on	some	universally	agreed	
formula.	 The	 formula	 is	 constructed	 to	 represent	 real	 economic	 activity	 or	






(see	Picciotto,	2014;	Kobetsky,	2011).	 In	 its	 ideal	 form	 it	 renders	manipulative	
transfer	pricing	redundant.	It	removes	the	incentive	to	shift	nominal	operations	
into	 different	 jurisdictions,	 since	 there	 is	 no	 immediate	 advantage	 to	 doing	 so.	
Reporting	 strategies	 resulting	 in	 profit	 shifting	 would	 not	 affect	 actual	
apportionment,	 since	 unitary	 taxation	 is	 based	 on	 a	 common	 standardised	




This	 in	 turn	 would	 provide	 one	 avenue	 through	 which	 low‐commitment	
capitalism	 might	 be	 addressed.	 Concomitantly	 the	 pressures	 on	 states	 to	
accommodate	MNCs	would	qualitatively	alter.	There	might	still	be	the	potential	
for	 tax	 competition	 in	 order	 to	 attract	 investment	 and	 employment,	 but	 there	
would	be	no	pressure	 to	 tacitly	 facilitate	 tax	avoidance	 in	ways	 that	 create	net	
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losses	 to	 all	 states.	 The	 consequences	 of	 double	 non‐taxation	 would	 also	 be	
obviated.	For	example,	the	practice	of	accumulating	funds	in	tax	havens,	which	the	
MNC	then	resists	repatriating,	would	no	longer	have	an	organizational	basis.	Tax	
havens	 would	 thus	 begin	 to	 whither	 since	 one	 of	 their	 functions	 would	 be	
curtailed.		
Standardisation	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 basis	 of	 treaty	 shopping	 would	
dissolve.	As	such,	the	dynamics	of	the	current	system	in	which	MNCs	play	off	states	
against	each	other	would	be	altered.	This	would	be	a	structural	transformation.	It	
would	 transcend	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 case‐by‐case	 loophole	 approach.	 The	












of	 UK	 and	US	 government	 hearings	 on	 the	 subject	makes	 this	 clear.	 Particular	
corporations	 are	 called	 as	 witnesses	 regarding	 tax	 avoidance	 and	 come	 with	
prepared	statements	and	legal	representation.	An	impasse	typically	results.		Well‐
intentioned	 interlocutors	 engage	 in	 moralising,	 which	 also	 raises	 their	 media	












economic	 activity.	 The	MNC	makes	 choices	 and	 these	 are	 reflected	 in	different	





following	the	 law	becomes	leading	the	 law	to	places	one	can	take	 it	 in	order	to	
exploit	a	potential.	This	latter	sense	begins	from	an	adversarial	relation	between	





corporate	 social	 responsibility	and	corporate	 citizenship.	Yet	 it	 is	 intrinsic	 to	a	
legalistic	response	to	issues	of	tax	avoidance.	It	thus	stands	at	odds	with	many	of	
the	claims	the	same	corporations	may	make	in	other	contexts.	
The	 point	 to	 emphasise	 is	 that	 a	 unitary	 approach	 to	 corporation	 tax	
removes	 the	basis	 through	which	contradiction	arises.	 	Unitary	taxation	can	be	
part	 of	 a	 credible	 approach	 to	 restoring	 trust.	 It	 places	 corporate	 activity	 in	 a	
different	 context.	 It	 provides	 an	 institutional	 basis	 that	 removes	 some	
opportunities	for	practices	that	undermine	ethical	conduct.	The	impasse	between	
moralising	and	legalism	is	thus	potentially	transcended.	As	such,	unitary	taxation	




forms	 of	 behaviour	 are	 denied	 to	 the	 firm	 (see	 Lawson,	 2015).	 There	 is	 still	 a	
difference	between	denying	an	avenue	for	some	forms	of	behaviour	and	changing	
the	perspective	of	 firms	in	regard	of	their	behaviour.	Concomitantly,	 it	remains	





implication	 is	 that	 the	 socialisation	 of	 firms	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 constructive	
cultures	 matters.	 This	 is	 something	 that	 new	 research	 in	 economics	 and	
organizations	increasingly	recognizes	for	tax	issues.	Until	recently	a	rational	actor	
model	dominated	theory	and	research	(based	on	Allingham	and	Sandmo,	1972).	
However,	 there	 is	 now	 a	 growing	 focus	 on	 reconceptualising	 tax‐related	
behaviour	 and	 exploring	 different	 ways	 to	 socialise	 or	 incentivise	 compliance.	
This	 work	 comes	 under	 the	 general	 heading	 of	 ‘tax	 morale’	 (see	 Lutmer	 and	














corporations	 with	 entities	 in	 several	 states	 and	 provinces	 (different	 tax	
jurisdictions).	More	than	40	US	states	use	versions	of	unitary	taxation,	and	many	
of	 these	 were	 developed	 separately	 and	 so	 vary	 in	 detail.	 Since	 1967	 the	 US	
Multistate	Commission	has	worked	to	encourage	uniformity	among	the	versions.	
Many	of	the	problems	experienced	are	concerned	with	rendering	the	separately	
developed	 systems	 commensurate,	 so	 problems	 are	 historically	 cumulative.	
However,	the	broader	potential	of	unitary	taxation	concerns	collective	agreement	
	 13




effects	 on	 tax	 rates	 between	 states).	 It	 need	 not	 stand	 alone.	 In	 any	 case,	
identifying	problems	of	disjoints	 in	actually	existing	systems	within	 federalised	
states	 is	not	quite	 the	appropriate	context	 in	which	 to	consider	 its	appeal.	The	






problems.	 It	 cannot	 be	 divorced	 from	 the	 political	 economy	 in	 which	 it	 is	
embedded.	 It	 is	not	 immune	to	the	structural	power	of	capital.	For	example,	as	
previously	noted,	unitary	taxation	potentially	recovers	the	sovereignty	of	the	state	
vis‐à‐vis	 the	 corporation.	 However,	 though	 corporations	 would	 find	 it	 more	
difficult	to	continue	to	develop	loopholes	in	relation	to	transfer	pricing,	they	could	
lobby	for	concessions	and	exemptions	in	a	unitary	system.	But	any	constructive	
change	 to	 how	 corporations	 are	 taxed	 confronts	 these	 issues	 of	 power	 –	 and	
corporate	 lobbying	 is	 not	 the	 only	 source	 of	 political	 influence	 or	 agency	 for	
political	will.	Awareness	matters	in	so	far	as	it	creates	scope	for	solutions	to	be	
worked	 towards	 and	 implemented,	 often	 in	 incremental	 ways.	 One	 cannot	 be	
supportive	 of	 options	 one	 does	 not	 know	 about,	 and	 such	 options	 cannot	 gain	
momentum	unless	 they	are	supported.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 the	Tax	 Justice	
Network,	typically	positions	its	interventions	in	terms	of	cumulative	momentum	
for	 constructive	 change	 (see	 Spencer,	 2013;	 also,	 Seabrooke	 and	Wigan,	 2013;	
CRC,	2014).	Neither	the	state	nor	the	global	political	economy	and	its	institutions	











however,	do	not	 fully	commit	 to	a	unitary	approach.	 Instead	there	has	been	an	
amalgam	 of	 individual	 policy	 formulations.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 2014	 the	 G‐20	
adopted	several	OECD	initiatives.	Specifically,	members	committed	themselves	to	
requiring	MNCs	by	2017	to	engage	in	country	by	country	reporting	of	revenue,	





and	 address	 tax	 avoidance	 and	 prosecute	 tax	 evasion.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	
	 14
address	the	fundamental	context	in	which	tax	avoidance	and	evasion	occur.	The	
MNC	 can	 still	 be	motivated	 to	 construct	 organizational	 circuits,	 since	 separate	
entity	status	and	the	arm’s	length	principle	still	apply.	The	whole	is	still	subject	to	







released	 in	 October	 2015	 can	 also	 be	 interpreted	 as	 incremental	 reform	 to	 a	
















GAAR	 specifically	 excludes	 cases	 covered	 by	 double	 taxation	 treaties	 (HMRC,	
2013:	p.	7).	It	seems	unlikely	then	that	the	current	GAAR	can	serve	as	an	effective	




government	 domestic	 policy	 regarding	 tax	 avoidance.	 In	 his	 2014	 Autumn	
Statement	 Chancellor	 Osborne	 announced	 the	 government	 would	 introduce	 a	
‘diverted	profits	tax’	and	this	was	confirmed	in	the	2015	budget.	The	process	of	
implementation	has	begun	 for	 the	 tax	year	2015‐16	(HMRC,	2015b).	The	 tax	 is	
actually	in	the	form	of	a	25%	levy	on	profits	‘artificially’	shifted	out	of	the	country.	
The	tax	is	yet	to	be	fully	detailed	as	a	regulatory	measure	(in	March	it	remained	
interim,	 thereafter	 it	 is	 embryonic	 in	 the	 2015	 Finance	 Act).	 It	 has	 been	 put	
together	quite	quickly	and	will	evolve	as	it	is	implemented	and	tested.	However,	
the	intention	is	clearly	to	capture	some	portion	of	the	proceeds	of	transfer	pricing.	

































to	 implement	a	policy	 that	may	 later	be	adopted	by	all.	Given	 the	public	mood	
regarding	 tax	 avoidance,	 and	 given	 the	 continued	 support	 of	 the	 EU	 Tax	
Commissioner,	there	is	some	possibility	that	this	may	occur	for	the	CCCTB	in	the	
near	future.	The	momentum	for	change	within	the	G‐8(7)	and	G‐20	and	OECD	may	






Unitary	 taxation	 based	 on	 formula	 apportionment	 resolves	 an	 underlying	
problem	within	 contemporary	 capitalism.	 It	 has	 multiple	 potential	 benefits.	 It	
prevents	 tax	 minimisation	 where	 real	 and	 effective	 rates	 diverge,	 and	
corporations	are	able	to	choose	not	to	contribute	to	the	reproduction	of	society	







the	 failures	 of	 the	 current	 system.	 Corporation	 tax	 is	 recognized	 as	 deeply	













the	 ‘context	 of	 context’,	 that	 is,	 the	 political	 institutional	 and	 juridical	 terrain’.	
However,	the	context	of	context	continues	to	develop	and	the	future	may	range	
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rejoinder	 see	 the	 testimonies	 of	 Timothy	 Cook	 CEO	 and	 other	 Apple	 representatives	 in	 Levin,	
2013)	
vii		“According	to	Article	107(1)	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	(TFEU),	











trillion	 (Henry,	 2012).	 Access	 to	 and	 use	 of	 these	 havens	 is	 created	 by	 prominent	 financial	












xiii	 An	 additional	 initiative	 worth	 consideration	 is	 the	 US	 Foreign	 Account	 Tax	 Compliant	 Act	
(FATCA)	2010.	This	targets	tax	abuse	indirectly	by	placing	a	pressure	on	intermediaries	operative	
in	US	territories	to	sanction	third	parties;	it	thus	extends	US	influence	to	non‐US	spaces	and	actors.	
The	Act	also	encourages	other	OECD	states	to	emulate	its	position,	so	the	approach	is	unilateral	
but	directed	at	multilateral	transformation	(see	Palan	and	Wigan,	2014)	See	also	Richard	Murphy’s	
UK	Fair	Tax	Mark	initiative.	http://www.fairtaxmark.net/ftm15‐historic‐day‐fair‐tax‐mark/	
xiv	It	is	based	on	the	following	formula,	the	algebra	alters	slightly	for	the	2011	directive	(EC,	2011a:	
Article	86,	p.	49):	
	
xv		Notably	that	adoption	creates	transitional	risks	and	uncertainty	for	individual	states	and	that	
the	policy	may	lead	to	pressure	for	harmonisation	of	corporation	tax,	which	some	of	the	states	who	
consider	tax	to	be	a	part	of	a	competitive	environment	oppose.	
